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A Post-Morse Framework for Students'
Potentially Hurtful Speech (Religious and
Otherwise)
EMILY GOLD WALDMAN*
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Morse v. Frederick' in
December of 2006, it received an unusual mix of amicus briefs in support
of ACLU-represented high school senior Joseph Frederick. Frederick, who
had sued his principal after being suspended for waving a banner stating
"Bong Hits 4 Jesus" at an Olympic torch rally that he attended with class-
mates during school hours, had on his side not only the usual suspects, such
as the Students Press Law Center and the National Coalition Against
Censorship? Also supporting him were six conservatively-oriented reli-
gious advocacy groups:4 the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ);5
*Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School,
2002; B.A., Yale University, 1999. This article is drawn from my presentation to the American
Association of Law Schools' Section on Education Law at the January 2008 AALS Annual
Meeting. I thank John Taylor for his extremely helpful comments on the piece, and Samantha
Schwartz for her excellent research assistance.
1. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). The petition for a writ of certiorari was granted on December 1,
2006. See 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006).
2. See Brief for the Students Press Law Center, Feminists for Free Expression, the First
Amendment Project, the Freedom to Read Foundation, and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Morse v. Frederick, 127
S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 542417.
3. See Brief of the National Coalition Against Censorship and the American Booksellers
Foundation for Free Expression as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Morse v. Frederick,
127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 550929.
4. Drawing on the work of Ira C. Lupu and Robert Tuttle, John Taylor would refer to these
groups as "religionists." See John E. Taylor, Why Student Religious Speech is Speech, 110 W. VA.
L. REv. 240 & n.62 (2007) (hereinafter Taylor, Student Religious Speech); Ira C. Lupu & Robert
Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILE. L. REV.
37, 48 (2002). Taylor describes "religionists" as a label "encompass[ing] anyone who wants
aggressive protection of free exercise interests in the public schools, whether it is Douglas
Laycock or the lawyers from the American Center for Law & Justice.... They wish to maximize
the space for religious expression in the schools even at a cost to what others might see as
Establishment Clause Values." Taylor, Student Religious Speech, at 240 n.62.
5. See Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice in Support of Respondent,
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 550934 (hereinafter "ACLJ
Brief'). In its amicus brief, the American Center for Law and Justice described itself as "a not-
for-profit legal and educational organization dedicated to, inter alia, the defense of free speech."
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the Christian Legal Society;6 the Alliance Defense Fund;7 the Liberty Legal
Institute;8 Liberty Counsel,9 and the Rutherford Institute.'0 Morse thus
became one of the rare cares uniting the ACLU with the ACLJ."
Id. at * 1. The group's website states that it "focuses on the issues that matter most to you -
national security, protecting America's families, and protecting human life." See
http://www.aclj.org/About/ (last visited May 28, 2008).
6. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Christian Legal Society in Support of Respondent, Morse
v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 550932 (hereinafter "Christian
Legal Society Brief'). In its amicus brief, the Christian Legal Society described itself as an
"interdenominational association of Christian attorneys, law students, judges, and law profes-
sors" that "strives to preserve religious freedom in order that men and women might be free to
do God's will." Id. at * 1. The group's website indicates its opposition to abortion and gay mar-
riage. See http://www.clsnet.com (last visited May 28, 2008).
7. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Alliance Defense Fund Supporting Respondent, Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 542418 (hereinafter "Alliance Defense
Fund Brief'). The Alliance Defense Fund Brief stated that it was a "public interest legal organ-
ization providing strategic planning, training, funding, and direct litigation services to protect our
first constitutional liberty-religious freedom." Id. at * 1. The group's website lists its three
main issues as "Religious Freedom, "Sanctity of Human Life," and "Family Values." See
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org (last visited May 28, 2008).
8. See Brief of the Liberty Legal Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 550930 (hereinafter "Liberty
Legal Institute Brief'). The Liberty Legal Institute described itself as a "non-profit law firm ded-
icated to the preservation of First Amendment rights and religious freedom." Id. at * 1. Its web-
site includes a quotation from the Dallas Morning News describing Liberty Legal Institute as the
"flip side to [the] ACLU," and describes its positions in favor of the partial-birth abortion ban
upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) and the Texas
sodomy law held unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). See
http://www.libertylegal.org (last visited May 28, 2008).
9. Liberty Counsel, founded by the dean of Liberty University School of Law, described
itself in its amicus brief as a "national nonprofit litigation, education and policy organization ded-
icated to advancing religious freedom, the sanctity of human life, and the traditional family." See
Brief for Amicus Curiae Liberty Counsel in Support of Respondent, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.
Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 542416, at * 1 (hereinafter "Liberty Counsel Brief'); see
also http://www.lc.org (last visited May 28, 2008).
10. See Brief of the Rutherford Institute, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent, Morse
v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 527496 (hereinafter Rutherford
Brief). The Rutherford Institute described itself in its amicus brief as an "international civil lib-
erties organization," Id. at * 1; its website explains that "The Rutherford Institute is a civil liber-
ties organization that provides free legal services to people whose constitutional and human
rights have been threatened or violated" http://www.rutherford.org/About/History.asp (last visit-
ed July 7, 2008). The group is particularly well-known for its representation of Paula Jones in
the Jones v. Clinton lawsuit. See Neil A. Lewis, Group Behind Paula Jones Gains Critics as Well
as Fame, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 18, 1998) (describing the Rutherford Institute as "a kind of evangeli-
cal Christian civil liberties union").
11. Morse was not the first time that these groups found themselves on the same side of an
issue. Although the ACLU and ACLJ (along with other like-minded groups) frequently diverge
on issues including abortion, gay rights, euthanasia, and purported Establishment Clause viola-
tions, they sometimes adopt similar positions with respect to free speech and free exercise issues.
For example, in 2006 the ACLU and ACLJ filed a joint friend-of-the-court brief in support of
[Vol. 37, No. 4
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As these religious groups made clear in their briefs, they felt no par-
ticular affinity with Frederick's banner, which he himself described as
containing mere "nonsense" words designed to attract television cam-
eras. But they were concerned that in the course of resolving the case,
the Supreme Court would recognize, on broadly-worded grounds, the
school's right to censor his speech, thus setting a precedent that implic-
itly limited other students' rights to express their religious views at
school. The groups therefore urged the Supreme Court either to affirm
the judgment below in Frederick's favor, dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted, or - if the Court were inclined to find in favor of
the school - to reverse on very narrow grounds. 2
These groups' concerns were not merely hypothetical. In recent years,
there have been an increasing number of cases involving clashes between
students seeking to express their religiously-motivated views at school
and schools that have restricted such messages out of concern that they
will be hurtful to other students. (In fact, the above-mentioned religious
groups have represented plaintiff students in several such cases.) Thus
far, such conflicts have centered around two main types of religiously-
motivated student speech: speech opposing homosexuality and speech
opposing abortion. In Harper v. Poway United School District,3 for
instance a student sued his school in 2004 after it prohibited him from
wearing a T-shirt that stated "BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL
EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" on the front, and
"HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL, Romans 1:27" on the back."
plaintiffs suing under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See http://www.aclutx.org/
article.php?aid=391 (last visited May 28, 2008). Similarly, back in 1993, the ACLU and the ACLJ
both supported the petitioners (with the ACLJ's Jay Sekulow arguing the case, and the ACLU sub-
mitting an amicus brief) in Lamb s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S.
384 (1993). For further discussion of Lamb's Chapel, see infra text accompanying notes 36-42.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 115-122.
13. 445 E3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007). The student
was represented by the Alliance Defense Fund. After the Supreme Court vacated as moot the
Ninth Circuit's decision affirming the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction (on
grounds that the district court had subsequently dismissed the case in full on summary judgment),
Harper's young sister - who was later added as a plaintiff - sought to reinstate the case and
moved for reconsideration. That motion was subsequently denied. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., Civ. No. 04-CV-1103, JAH (POR), slip op. (S.D. Ca. Feb. 12, 2008).
14. Id. at 1170. The notion that the school had "embraced" homosexuality referred to the
fact that the school had allowed the Gay-Straight Alliance to hold a "Day of Silence" that was
designed to teach tolerance of different sexual orientations. Id. at 1171. Harper wore the above-
described T-shirt on the day following the Day of Silence. (During the Day of Silence itself, he
wore a shirt that had the same message on the back and stated "I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT
GOD HAS CONDEMNED" on the front.) Id.
October 20081
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Similarly, in the 2005 case of Nixon v. Northern Local School District,'5
a student sued after being prohibited from wearing a T-shirt that stated
"Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is murder! Some issues
are just black and white!' 6 In 2007 alone, students brought at least four
lawsuits involving similar clashes, one of which was just decided - at
least at the preliminary injunction stage - by the Seventh Circuit.'7
In Morse itself, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled for the school dis-
trict on a narrowly-crafted rationale that did not resolve the developing
split over how to approach such cases. The Court held only that schools
may restrict student speech "that can reasonably be regarded as encour-
aging illegal drug use"'8 - a rationale that Liberty Legal Institute had, in
fact, proposed in its amicus brief. 9 And the crucial concurrence authored
by Justice Alito - who, as further discussed below, appears quite sym-
pathetic to religious students' free speech claims - explicitly stated that
it was joining the opinion "on the understanding that (a) it goes no fur-
ther to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable
observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) it pro-
vides no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be inter-
preted as commenting on any political or social issue."20
15. 383 F. Supp. 2d 956 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
16. Id. at 967.
17. See Raker v. Frederick County Pub. Schs., 470 F. Supp. 2d 634 (W.D. Va. 2007) (involv-
ing student's lawsuit over being prohibited from distributing anti-abortion literature to fellow stu-
dents in school); M.A.L. v. Kinsland, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6355 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2007)
(involving student's lawsuit over being prohibited from distributing anti-abortion literature and
engaging in certain other activities to express his opposition to abortion, such as wearing red tape
over his mouth on a designated day to symbolize that he spoke for unborn children); Zamecnik
v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28172 (N.D. 111. Apr. 17, 2007), rev'd, Nuxoll
v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8737 (7th Cir. Apr. 23, 2008) (involving stu-
dents' lawsuit over being prohibited from wearing a T-shirt stating "Be Happy, Not Gay" in
response to the school's "Day of Silence" intended to express tolerance of homosexuality);
Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25133 (6th Cir. 2007) (involv-
ing student's lawsuit over a previous school district policy against "making stigmatizing or insult-
ing comments regarding another student's sexual orientation," which he alleged had chilled "his
responsibility as a Christian.. .to tell others when their conduct does not comport with his under-
standing of Christian morality"), vacated, 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008).
18. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
19. Liberty Legal Institute Brief, 2007 WL 550930 (No. 06-278), at * 14 - * 16. See infra
text accompanying notes 122, 137.
20. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring). As discussed further below, Justice
Alito's concurrence is arguably the controlling precedent. See infra text accompanying notes
129-130.
[Vol. 37, No. 4
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In the meantime, the debate over how to resolve such cases has con-
tinued to percolate among the lower courts. The dissension is particular-
ly pronounced with regard to religious speech opposing homosexuality.
While the Ninth Circuit ruled in Harper that the school was entitled to
prohibit the student from wearing his t-shirt, it did so over an impas-
sioned dissent, and several other courts have come out the other way in
similar cases, such as the Seventh Circuit in Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie
School District.2'
It is not surprising that courts have failed to reach consensus on how
to approach cases where one student's religious expression is potential-
ly hurtful to other students. The now-four Supreme Court cases on stu-
dent speech - Morse, along with the well-known trilogy of Tinker,22
Fraser,2 and Hazelwood24 - do not provide clear answers here.
Tinker, in upholding the right of students to wear armbands in protest
of the Vietnam War back in 1969, held that schools could only restrict
students' expression of their opinions if that speech would either (1)
"materially and substantially" disrupt the work of the school or (2)
invade the rights of others.25 But does speech like the T-shirt in Harper
qualify as substantially disrupting school activities? Is it sufficient for
the speech to disrupt the educational experience of one gay student, or is
a more widespread disruption required? Alternatively, does such speech
invade the rights of gay students in the school? The Harper majority
believed that it did and rested its holding on that ground.26 But the
Harper dissent agreed with several other courts' interpretation of that
language as referring only to those situations where the speech itself
amounts to a tort or crime, such as defamation or blackmail." (Indeed,
Harper has been recognized as the first case to base its holding on
Tinker's "invasion of rights" justification as opposed to its "material dis-
ruption" justification, which has long been the dominant prong.28)
21. 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8737 (7th Cir. Apr. 23, 2008).
22. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
24. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
25. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
26. Harper, 445 F. 3d at 1178-83.
27. Id. at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., Douglas D. Frederick, Casenote, Restricting Student Speech that Invades' Others
Rights: A Novel Interpretation of Student Speech Jurisprudence in Harper v. Poway Unified School
District, 29 HAwAn L. REv. 479, 493 (2007); Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children's
Rights, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. 317, 357 n.251 (2007); Recent Case: Constitutional Law-Freedom of
Speech-Ninth Circuit Upholds Public School's Prohibition ofAnti-Gay T-Shirts, 120 HARv. L. REv.
1691, 1694-95 (2007); see also Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 974
October 20081
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Fraser, decided by the Supreme Court in 1986, provides even cloudier
guidance. There, the Court held that a school was entitled to discipline a
student for giving a speech at a school assembly that used an "elaborate,
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor," noting the "marked distinction
between the political 'message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual
content of [the student's] speech there" and stating that schools were enti-
tled to restrict "offensively lewd and indecent speech."2 9 But religiously-
motivated speech opposing homosexuality and abortion, offensive though
it may be to some, cannot be said to be lewd or to lack political content.
The Court's 1988 Hazelwood decision, in turn, set forth a much more
lenient standard for school restrictions on school-sponsored student
speech (such as that expressed in a school newspaper or play), holding
that such speech can be restricted as long as the restriction is reasonably
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.3" But in many circum-
stances, including the cases described above, the speech at issue has not
been expressed through a school-sponsored vehicle. Rather, it is merely
happening to occur at school, rendering Hazelwood inapplicable.
Finally, last year in Morse, the Supreme Court charted a course that
avoided addressing this issue. But while Morse's holding was explicitly
narrow, aspects of the majority opinion and Justice Alito's concurrence
do have some interesting implications for situations where students' reli-
giously-motivated speech may be hurtful to other students.
In this Article, I weave together strands from Tinker, Fraser, and
Morse, as well as from lower court decisions taking varying approaches
to this issue, to propose a new standard for student speech that is poten-
tially hurtful to other students. This approach encompasses, without
being limited to, speech that is religiously-motivated in nature.31 I argue
that student speech that is hurtful to other students (whether religiously-
("[D]efendants point to no authority interpreting what 'invasion on the rights of others' really
entails. In fact, the Court is not aware of a single decision that has focused on that language in
Tinker as the sole basis for upholding a school's regulation of student speech.").
29. Fraser 478 U.S. at 678, 680, 685.
30. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
31. My proposal thus accords with numerous scholars' arguments that courts should analyze
controversies regarding religious speech by employing generally applicable speech doctrine, as
opposed to developing particularized standards for religious speech. John Taylor recently made
this argument in the specific context of student religious speech. See generally Taylor, supra note
4. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have made this argument with respect to religious
speech and conduct as a whole, advancing a model of "Equal Liberty" within which both reli-
giously-motivated and non-religiously-motivated behavior are placed on an equal footing
through the use of broadly applicable frameworks. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber and
Lawrence G. Sager, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTTUTION (2007).
[Vol. 37, No. 4
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motivated or not) should first be divided into two categories: (1) speech
that identifies particular students for attack; and (2) speech, such as the
message on Harper's T-shirt, that expresses a general opinion without
being directed at particularly named (or otherwise identified) students.32
Schools should receive great latitude to restrict the first category of
speech, which essentially amounts to verbal bullying. By contrast,
potentially hurtful speech that does not single out specific students and
simply expresses a general viewpoint should be restricted only if it is
likely to materially disrupt at least one other student's education (which
I define as tangibly interfering with his ability to learn and succeed at
school).
The Article begins by looking at the case law that emerged on this
issue between 2001 - which ushered in a new era of these sorts of
cases - and the Morse decision. In this section, I situate the rise of
these cases in the larger context of disputes involving religious speech
in the schools and explore what makes this particular category of cases
distinct. I then turn to the Supreme Court's June 2007 Morse decision,
teasing out its implications for student speech, religious or otherwise,
that is potentially hurtful to other students. In the Article's third and
final section, I articulate in more detail my proposed standard and
explain why it strikes the appropriate balance among the competing
interests recognized in the case law.
I. THE UNSETTLED CASE LAW ON STUDENTS'
POTENTIALLY HURTFUL RELIGIOUS SPEECH
The cases involving clashes over students' potentially hurtful religious
speech, thus far largely about homosexuality and abortion, represent one
important category in the general rise of cases involving students' reli-
gious speech. Additional key categories include cases involving students'
32. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Comment: Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992) (analyzing the constitutionality of workplace harassment law under
Title VII and related state statutes, and concluding that restrictions on harassing speech that is
directed at a particular individual are constitutional, but that restrictions on undirected speech are
not).
October 20081
HeinOnline -- 37 J.L. & Educ. 469 2008
470 Journal of Law & Education
submissions of religiously-themed writing and artwork in response to
broadly-worded school assignments and projects,33 cases involving stu-
dents' attempts to distribute religious materials and items in the schools,34
and cases involving students' formation of religious clubs. 5
All four categories of cases have derived considerable momentum from
the Supreme Court's move toward viewing schools' exclusions of religious
messages as unconstitutional viewpoint-based, rather than permissible con-
tent-based, speech discrimination. A critical point in this evolution was the
1993 Supreme Court case Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District,36 in which the defendant school district had adopted a pol-
icy that permitted school property to be used outside of school hours for
"social, civic, or recreational uses" but not for "religious purposes."37 A
unanimous Court held that this was viewpoint rather than content discrim-
ination, and that the district had to allow a local evangelical church to use
school facilities for a film series about "traditional Christian family val-
ues."38 The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in its 1995 decision in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,39 in which it
33. See, e.g., Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40027 (E.D. Pa.
June 1, 2007); Peck v. Baldwinsville Central Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 631-633 (2d Cir. 2005);
Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208 (11 th Cir. 2004); Fleming v. Jefferson
County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 E3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002); C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir.
1999), vacated and resolved on other grounds, 226 E3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000); DeNooyer v. Livonia
Pub. Schs., 799 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1992) , aff'd, 1993 U.S. App. 20606 (6th Cir. 1993)
(summary order); Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
34. See, e.g., Curry v. Saginaw City Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 881 (6th Cir. 2008);
M.B. v. Liverpool Cent. Sch. Dist., 487 F. Supp. 2d 117 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); Walz v. Egg Harbor
Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2003).
35. See, e.g., Truth v. Grohe, 499 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2007); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 E3d 1074
(9th Cir. 2002); Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996).
36. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). The ACL represented the petitioners in this case before the
Supreme Court, and the ACLU submitted an amicus brief on their behalf.
37. Id. at 387. Following the Supreme Court's holding in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981), that state universities could not deny student religious groups access to facilities that were
generally available to student groups, numerous public school districts, including Center
Moriches, had created narrower policies that only provided access to school property for certain
enumerated uses. See The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 396,
397 & n.4 (2001).
38. Id. at 388. The Court explained:
There is no suggestion from the courts below or from the District or the State that a lec-
ture or film about childrearing and family values would not be a use for social or civic
purposes otherwise permitted ..... The film series involved here no doubt dealt with
a subject otherwise permissible under [the relevant provision], and its exhibition was
denied solely because the series dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint.
Id. at 393-94.
39. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Here, unlike in Lamb's Chapel, the ACLU and ACLJ (along with
the Christian Legal Society) submitted amicus briefs on opposite sides.
[Vol. 37, No. 4
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held that University of Virginia's policy of providing funding for certain
student extracurricular groups, but not for student religious groups,
amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.' And in 2000, the
Court extended Lamb's Chapel even further, holding in Good News v.
Milford Central School" that once a school district had permitted school
buildings to be used for social, civic, and recreational meetings, it was com-
mitting viewpoint discrimination by prohibiting an outside evangelical
Christian organization from holding proselytizing meetings for elementary
school students in the school cafeteria immediately after school ended.42
The plaintiff students in each of the four categories have heavily
employed viewpoint-discrimination rhetoric in support of their claims.
From the second category (submission of religiously-themed assign-
ments), a good example is Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School
District,43 where the plaintiff student argued that his school had commit-
ted viewpoint discrimination when, after he handed in a poster depicting
Jesus in fulfillment of an assignment to create a poster illustrating ways
to help the environment, his teacher hung his poster in a way that con-
cealed the Jesus figure." An illustrative case from the third category
(distribution of religious materials) is Walz v. Egg Harbor Township,"
40. Id. at 830-37.
41. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). Here, too, the ACLU submitted an amicus brief on the side of the
defendant school, while the ACLJ (along with the Christian Legal Society, Liberty Legal
Institute, and Liberty Counsel) came in on the other side. In its amicus brief, the ACLU
explained that here, unlike in Lamb's Chapel, it believed that providing the religious group with
its requested access would violate the Establishment Clause. The brief (which the ACLU joint-
ly submitted with numerous other organizations) stated that:
Several of the undersigned amici submitted a brief in Lamb's Chapel in support of the
Court's holding because various factors in the case combined to ensure that a reason-
able observer would not perceive the religious activity at issue to be endorsed or spon-
sored by the school. The overwhelming factors in this case counsels the opposite
result. Lamb's Chapel involved use of a public school during the evening hours; this
case involves access shortly before the end of the school day and immediately there-
after. The event in Lamb's Chapel was open to all members of the community, while
the audience in this instance is limited to the school's elementary students.
Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the American Jewish Committee, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and People for the
American Way Foundation in Support of the Respondent, 2001 WL 43353.
42. Id. at 108-112. The Court further held that, even assuming arguendo that avoidance of
an Establishment Clause violation could justify viewpoint discrimination, there was no threat of
such a violation here. Id. at 112-13.
43. 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005).
44. Id. at 620-23, 630-31. On the strength of this argument, the plaintiff (represented by
Liberty Counsel) succeeded in getting the Second Circuit to vacate the summary judgment dis-
missal of his case. Id. at 630-34.
45. 342 F.3d 271 (2003).
October 2008]
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where the plaintiff student asserted that his school had committed view-
point discrimination by refusing to let him distribute pencils and candy
canes with religious messages at his classroom's seasonal holiday
party.' Similarly, a good example from the fourth category (religious
clubs) is Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area School Board,47 in which the
plaintiff student argued that her school had engaged in viewpoint dis-
crimination by not allowing her Bible club to meet during the school
"activity period. 48
Finally, to circle back around to the first category - this Article's focus -
the plaintiff in Harper asserted that his school's censorship of his anti-gay
T-shirt amounted to impermissible viewpoint discrimination, particularly
given that his school had just held a "Day of Silence" event to promote tol-
erance of different sexual orientations. 9 Similarly, the plaintiff in Nuxoll
sought to wear his "Be Happy, Not Gay" T-shirt directly in response to his
school's Day of Silence event.5 0 On a national level, the Alliance Defense
Fund - one of the Christian groups that filed an amicus brief in Joseph
Frederick's support - has organized an annual "Day of Truth" event to
occur shortly after the annual Day of Silence, in order to "counter the pro-
motion of the homosexual agenda and express an opposing viewpoint from
a Christian perspective."'" Many of these confrontations are thus develop-
ing in a way that intentionally and precisely frames the viewpoint-discrim-
ination issue for the courts.
But, the first category of cases still stands somewhat apart from the
three latter categories. In these latter categories, the fundamental con-
46. The plaintiff's viewpoint discrimination argument is described in more detail in the dis-
trict court opinion in the case. See Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 187 F. Supp. 2d 232,
239-240 (D. N.J. 2002). The district court rejected it, reasoning that the class party was a vehi-
cle for distribution of generic gifts, rather than being "designed to promote any point of view, reli-
gious, commercial, or secular." Id. The Third Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that the school "had
prohibited the exchange of gifts with commercial, political, religious, or other undertones that
promoted a specific message." Walz, 342 F.3d at 279.
47. 336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003).
48. Id. at 214. The student, represented by the Rutherford Institute, was successful in this
argument. Id. at 214, 225-26.
49. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1184-1186. As discussed further below, the majority rejected this
argument, while the dissent found it persuasive. See infra text accompanying notes 67-82.
50. Nuxoll, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8737, at * 4.
51. See http://dayoftruth.org (last visited May 15, 2008). See also http://dayofsilence.org
(last visited May 15, 2008). This year, the Day of Silence occurred on April 25, 2008 (a Friday),
and the Day of Truth occurred on April 28, 2008 (the following Monday). See also Mark Walsh,
'Day of Silence' in Schools Brings Unity, Controversy, EDUCATION WEEK, April 23, 2008, at 6.
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cern motivating the schools' restrictions on the religious speech in ques-
tion is typically fear of an Establishment Clause violation. Schools that
refuse to display students' religiously-themed posters and murals in the
hallways, prohibit students from distributing proselytizing materials
during school hours, or decline to authorize students' religious clubs
generally cite their concern that other students will perceive some level
of school endorsement of the religious speech.52 By contrast, schools
prohibiting the first category of speech have been much less focused on
Establishment Clause issues (which are generally less salient here), and
much more concerned about complaints by other students who feel
harassed. 3 As such, this particular category of clashes over student reli-
gious speech connects up not only with the other categories of cases
involving students' religious speech, but also with cases involving
schools' ability to restrict harassing speech by students. Such cases have
become increasingly common since the Supreme Court's 1999 decision
in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,54 where the Court held
that a student could sue her school under Title IX for showing deliberate
indifference to severe and pervasive peer harassment."
52. See, e.g., Peck, 426 F.3d at 622, 624, 633; Bannon, 387 F.3d at 1211, 1220 n. 2; Curry,
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 881, at * 19; Donovan, 336 F.3d at 225-226.
53. See, e.g., Harper, 445 F.3d at 1170-73. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94.
54. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
55. Id. at 632 (holding that a private damages action may lie under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq., in cases of student-on-student harassment where
the school has acted "with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or
activities," and where the harassment at issue was "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive that it effectively bar[red] the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit").
Title IX prohibits educational programs receiving federal funding from engaging in sex-based
discrimination, and Davis arose in the context of peer sexual harassment. It built on the Supreme
Court's previous holding, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274
(1998), that a school district could be held liable under Title IX when it showed deliberate indif-
ference to known acts of teacher-student sexual harassment.
Lower courts have extended Davis's reasoning to harassment cases brought under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits federally-funded programs from discriminating on the
basis of race, color, and national origin. See, e.g., Bryant v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1-38 of Garvin
County, 334 F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir. 2003). Some courts have also construed Davis's interpreta-
tion of Title IX, particularly when taken in combination with the Equal Protection Clause, to con-
fer protection on students who are harassed by other students on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion. See, e.g., Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F3d 1130, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that students' lawsuit against school district for failing to act in response to peer harass-
ment of them based on their sexual orientation could go forward because the Equal Protection
clause required the school "to enforce District policies in cases of peer harassment of homosexual
and bisexual students in the same way that they enforce those policies in the cases of peer harass-
ment of heterosexual students"); see also Riccio v. Andree, 467 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2006).
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Indeed, the first major case falling into this category - Saxe v. State
College Area School District,56 decided by the Third Circuit in 2001 -
arose in direct response to a school district's anti-harassment policy.
That policy, after prohibiting harassment, proceeded to define harass-
ment as
[V]erbal or physical conduct based on one's actual perceived race,
religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or
other personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with a student's educational performance or cre-
ating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment. 7
Several students challenged the policy on First Amendment grounds,
stating that they were Christians who believed they had the right and the
religious obligation to "speak out about the sinful nature and harmful
effects of homosexuality," but that they feared being punished under the
policy for doing so.58
The Third Circuit, in an opinion authored by then-Judge Alito, ruled
in the students' favor. The Saxe court began by rejecting the district
court's conclusion that the policy merely mirrored existing federal pro-
hibitions and therefore must be constitutional, identifying two points of
divergence. First, although federal law prohibited only discrimination
based on sex, race, color, national origin, age and disability, the school
district policy went further, also covering sexual orientation and "other
personal characteristics" (defined as including, inter alia, clothing,
appearance, social skills, income, and values). 9 Second, while the
Supreme Court in Davis had defined harassment as being conduct that is
"so severe, pervasive, and objectively objective, and that so undermines
and detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the victim
students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources
and opportunities," the school district policy was not so limited and
potentially swept in even "simple acts of teasing and name-calling." 6
Having concluded that the policy's prohibitions extended beyond feder-
al anti-discrimination law, the Saxe court went on to evaluate whether the
policy's speech restrictions nonetheless passed muster under either Tinker,
Fraser, or Hazelwood - the Supreme Court's "trilogy" of student speech
56. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
57. Id. at 201.
58. Id. at 203-04.
59. Id. at 210.
60. Id. at 210-11.
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cases. The Saxe court easily concluded that Fraser and Hazelwood were
largely inapplicable here: the policy did not "confine itself merely to vul-
gar or lewd speech" (Fraser's focus); and it covered "far more than just
Hazelwood-type school-sponsored speech."6 That left Tinker, and the
question of whether the policy could be justified either under Tinker's first
prong (prevention of substantial disruption of the school's work) or its sec-
ond prong (prevention of the invasion of other students' rights). The Saxe
court found that neither prong was satisfied here. As to the first prong, the
court pointed out that the policy's disjunctive phrasing prohibited conduct
that had the purpose (even if not the effect) of causing substantial disrup-
tion.62 And as to the second prong, the court noted that Tinker's "invasion
of rights" language was unclear and that at least one court had construed
it as covering only independently tortious speech, such as defamation.63
The Saxe court stopped short of offering its own interpretation of the
phrase, but simply stated that "[i]n any case, it is certainly not enough that
the speech is merely offensive to some listener."' It concluded that the
instant policy -prohibiting conduct that created an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment, without specifying "any threshold showing of
severity or pervasiveness" - arguably pointed in that direction.6
Thus, the Saxe court struck down the district's policy as unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. The decision suggests, however, that had the policy
been narrowed to prohibit only "verbal or physical conduct based on
one's actual or perceived personal characteristics and which has the
effect of substantially interfering with a student's educational perform-
ance or creating a school environment that is severely or pervasively
intimidating, hostile, or offensive" (emphases added), the Saxe court
might well have upheld it.66
61. Id. at 216.
62. Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 .3d 200, 216-217 (3d Cir. 2001).
63. Id. at 217.
64. Id.
64. Id.
66. Indeed, the school district has modified its anti-harassment policy along such lines. The
policy now states:
The term "harassment" as used in this Policy means verbal, written, graphic or physi-
cal conduct which does or is reasonably believed under the totality of the circumstances
to (1) substantially or materially interfere with a student's or students' educational per-
formance; and/or (2) deny any student or students the benefits or opportunities offered
by the School District; and/or (3) substantially disrupt school operations or activities;
and/or (4) create a hostile or abusive environment which is of such pervasiveness and
severity that it materially and adversely alters the condition of student's or students'
educational environment, from both an objective viewpoint and the subjective view-
point of the student at whom the harassment is directed."
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Several years later, the Ninth Circuit - in Harper v. Poway - adopted
a far more deferential approach to school districts' speech restrictions.
There, in upholding a school district's prohibition of a student's T-shirt
stating "BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD
HAS CONDEMNED" and "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL," the
Ninth Circuit became the first court to adopt a broader interpretation of
Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong, and to uphold a speech restriction on
that basis alone.67 The Harper court stated:
Harper's wearing of his T-shirt "collides with the rights of other stu-
dents" in the most fundamental way. Public school students who
may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core, identifying
characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation have a
right to be free from such attacks while on school campuses. As
Tinker clearly states, students have the right to 'be secure and to be
let alone.' Being secure involves not only freedom from physical
assaults but from psychological attacks that cause young people to
question their self-worth and their rightful place in society.68
The Harper opinion, however, displayed some inconsistency. Its stated
rationale - protecting students' right to be free from psychological attacks
causing them to question their self-worth and rightful place in society -
would seem applicable to all students and all such attacks. But the major-
ity limited its holding "to instances of derogatory and injurious remarks
directed at students' minority status such as race, religion, and sexual ori-
entation."69 It reserved judgment as to gender-based remarks.70 And it
specifically indicated that its "rights of others" rationale did not encom-
pass "offensive words directed at majority groups such as Christians or
whites," on grounds that there was a "difference between a historically
See http://www.scasd.org/2497%5F75820145914/blank/Ibrowse.asp?A=383&BMDRN=
2000&BCOB= 0&C=47699 (last visited May 28, 2008). I further analyze Saxe's discussion of
the "invasion of rights" prong in Section IH of this article. See infra text accompanying notes
175-78.
67. The Harper majority expressly declined to reach the question of whether linker's "sub-
stantial disruption" prong would have justified the speech restriction. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1184.
Nor did it discuss whether Fraser applied. As noted above, see Harper note 13, the decision was
subsequently vacated as moot by the Supreme Court. In the continuing proceedings, however,
the district court continued to apply the Ninth Circuit's underlying reasoning. Harper, Civ. No.
04-CV-1103, JAH (POR), slip op. at 9 (S.D. Ca. Feb. 12, 2008). See infra note 173.
68. Id. at 1178.
69. Id. at 1183.
70. Id. at 1183 n.28.
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oppressed minority group that has been the victim of serious prejudice
and discrimination and a group that has always enjoyed a preferred
social, economic and political status."7' The court further suggested that
verbal attacks against majority groups would need to meet a higher
threshold - namely, Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong or Fraser's
"plainly offensive" test - before schools could restrict them.72 Apart from
largely conclusory language about the general differences between
majorities and minorities, however, the court did not explain why diver-
gent standards for verbal bullying of students - depending on their race,
religion, and sexual orientation - were appropriate or even legal. 3 Nor
did it flesh out precisely which students fell into which categories.
The Harper dissent, authored by Judge Alex Kozinski, pounced on this
point, asking: "In defining what is a minority - and hence protected - do
we look to the national community, the state, the locality or the school?
In a school that has 60 percent black students and 40 percent white stu-
dents, will the school be able to ban t-shirts with anti-black racist mes-
sages but not those with anti-white racist messages, or vice versa?"
More fundamentally, the dissent asked, "[I]f interference with the learn-
ing process is the keystone of the new right, how come it's limited to
those characteristics that are associated with minority status?"75 The dis-
sent further asserted that Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong should be
inapplicable to all such speech conflicts, reiterating the view that this
prong covers only "traditional rights, such as those against assault,
defamation, invasion of privacy, extortion and blackmail."76 Otherwise,
the dissent reasoned, "a state legislature could effectively overrule Tinker
by granting students an affirmative right not to be offended."77 Turning to
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Indeed, there is a strong argument that public schools' adoption of such divergent stan-
dards would violate the Equal Protection Clause, given the Supreme Court's rejection of the
notion that "benign" discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics is subject to lesser
scrutiny. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2764 ("This Court has recently reiterated.. .that 'all racial classifications [imposed by govern-
ment] ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny'.... Our cases clearly reject
the argument that motives affect the strict scrutiny analysis") (internal citations omitted).
74. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1201 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1198. The dissent did suggest, but seemed to retreat from, the possibility that
harassment that was "so severe and pervasive as to be tantamount to conduct" could violate a stu-
dent's rights. Id.
77. Id.
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Tinker's alternative prong, the dissent opined that it was not satisfied here
because there was insufficient evidence that Harper's T-shirt had caused
or was likely to cause substantial disruption.78 Judge Kozinski was par-
ticularly concerned about the viewpoint-discrimination issue, arguing
that Harper had not "thrust his view of homosexuality into the school
environment" unprompted, but had rather worn his T-shirt in response to
the school's Day of Silence.79
The Harper decision provoked intense discussion, both within and
outside the circuit. One Ninth Circuit judge requested a vote on whether
to rehear the matter en banc, and although a majority voted against
rehearing the case, further discussion ensued." Dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain (joined by
four other circuit judges) accused the panel majority of having sanc-
tioned "blatant viewpoint discrimination,"8' prompting Judge Stephen
Reinhardt (author of the original majority opinion) to respond: "Perhaps
some of us are unaware of, or have forgotten what it is like to be young,
belong to a small minority group, and be subjected to verbal assaults and
opprobrium while trying to get an education in a public school."82
Thus, Saxe, the Harper majority, and the Harper dissent all agreed
that Tinker was the most applicable precedent in analyzing school
restrictions on students' potentially hurtful religious speech. But they
staked out different positions as to how it applied. The Harper majority
and dissent fell on opposite extremes, given the majority's holding that
the "invasion of rights" prong was applicable here, and the dissent's con-
trary view that the "invasion of rights" prong was inapplicable and that
the "substantial disruption" prong should be very narrowly construed.
The Saxe court, while certainly much closer to the Harper dissent than
the Harper majority, can arguably be seen as falling somewhere in
between, for two reasons.
First, as to Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong, the Saxe court stat-
ed:
78. Id. at 1193-94.
79. Id. at 1196-97.
80. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006).
81. Id. at 1054 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
82. Harper, 455 E3d at 1053.
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We agree that the [State College Area School District] Policy's first
prong, which prohibits speech that would 'substantially interfere
with a student's educational performance,' may satisfy the Tinker
standard. The primary function of a public school is to educate its
students; conduct that substantially interferes with the mission is,
almost by definition, disruptive to the school environment.83
This language suggests that substantial disruption of even a single stu-
dent's educational experience can satisfy Tinker, and that a widespread
disruption is not necessarily required. The Harper dissent did not explic-
itly reach this issue. But some of the dissent's language - for example,
its focus on whether Harper's T-shirt had caused violence or materially
disrupted classwork, and its suggestion that a Jewish student's inability
to concentrate when faced with a fellow student's T-shirt stating "Hitler
Had the Right Idea ... Let's Finish the Job" would not satisfy Tinker's
"substantial disruption" prong - implied that in its view, a more wide-
spread disruption was necessary.84
Second, the Saxe court did not outright reject the applicability of
Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong to cases involving potentially hurtful
religious speech, but instead implied that this prong might be satisfied in
the case of severely or pervasively harassing speech.85 The Harper dis-
sent also initially raised this possibility, but seemed skeptical about it,
going on to state that "[t]he 'rights of others' language in Tinker can only
refer to traditional rights, such as those against assault, defamation, inva-
sion of privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose interplay with the First
Amendment is well established."86 Thus, here too there is arguably some
space between the Saxe court and the Harper dissent.
At the district court level, the courts have been far closer to Saxe (and
the Harper dissent) than the Harper majority. In Nixon v. Northern
Local School District,87 for example, the court held that a school could
83. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.
84. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1207 ("I have sympathy for defendants' position that students in school
are a captive audience and should not be forced to endure speech that they find offensive and
demeaning. There is surely something to the notion that a Jewish student might not be able to devote
his full attention to school activities if the fellow in the seat next to him is wearing a t-shirt with the
message 'Hitler Had the Right Idea' in front and 'Let's Finish the Job!' on the back. This T-shirt may
well interfere with the educational experience even if the two students never come to blows or even
have words about it .... Perhaps the narrow exceptions of Tinker should be broadened and multi-
plied. Perhaps Tinker should be overruled. But that is ajob for the Supreme Court, not for us.")
85. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.
86. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1198.
87. 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
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not prohibit a student from wearing a T-shirt that stated "INTOLER-
ANT. Jesus said... I am the way, the truth and the life. John 14:6" on
the front, and "Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a lie! Abortion is mur-
der! Some issues are just black and white!" on the back." The Nixon
court rejected the school district's argument that the restriction was jus-
tified under Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong, stating that the pres-
ence of students and staff members who were Muslims, homosexuals,
and who had undergone abortions, and the fact that they might be
offended by the T-shirt, fell "well short of the Tinker standard."8 9
Similarly, the Nixon court rejected the school district's invocation of
Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong, stating that there was no evidence
that the T-shirt's "silent, passive expression of opinion.., collided with
the rights of other students to be let alone."9 The court in Chambers v.
Babbitt reached a similar conclusion, holding unconstitutional a school's
ban on a "Straight Pride" sweatshirt.91 Likewise, in all of the cases
involving religiously-motivated speech opposing abortion (an issue that
has not yet reached the circuit level), the student plaintiffs have won.92
It is not surprising that courts have been unsettled as to exactly how to
apply the Supreme Court's Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood trilogy to clashes
involving students' potentially hurtful religious speech. None of the three
cases involved this sort of conflict. Even more importantly, all three of
the cases (the last of which, Hazelwood, was decided in 1988) preceded
the two key legal developments that have fueled these recent clashes.
First, as noted above, the viewpoint-discrimination argument for chal-
lenging restrictions on religious speech gained traction over the course of
the 1990s, providing momentum for students to bring these cases, start-
ing with Saxe in 2001. Second, on the other side of the equation, the
Supreme Court's 1999 Davis decision held that a student could sue her
88. Id. at 967, 974.
89. Id. at 973.
90. Id. at 974. The court did not make clear whether, in its view, an expression of opinion
could ever collide with another student's right to be "let alone." See also Chambers v. Babbitt,
145 F Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Minn. 2001) (granting injunction in favor of student who sought to wear
a sweatshirt stating "Straight Pride").
91. See Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Minn. 2001).
92. See Raker v. Frederick County Pub. Schs., 470 F Supp. 2d 634 (W.D. Va. 2007) (grant-
ing injunction in favor of student seeking to distribute anti-abortion literature to fellow students
in school); M.A.L. v. Kinsland, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6355 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2007) (same);
K.D. v. Fillmore Cent. Sch. Dist., 2005 WL 2175166 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (enjoining school from
prohibiting student from wearing T-shirt stating "ABORTION IS MURDER" on the front and
"You will not silence my message. You will not mock my God. You will stop killing my gener-
ation. Rock for Life!" on the back).
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school under Title IX for showing deliberate indifference to severe and
pervasive peer harassment, and some states provide even broader protec-
tion.93 This has left schools increasingly concerned about the threat of lia-
bility should they not take action against students' harassing conduct
toward other students. The two parallel developments have been on a col-
lision course, leaving school districts with no clear path to avoid liability
when choosing how to respond to students' potentially hurtful religious
speech. A perfect illustration of this double-bind is the fact that, at the
very same time the Poway Unified School District was being sued by
Harper over the prohibition of his "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAME-
FUL" T-shirt, it was also being sued in a California state court by two gay
former students who contended that the school had failed to protect them
against other students' anti-gay harassment of them.94
Given the lack of clarity on the subject, advocates for both religious
students and school districts have been eager for more up-to-date
Supreme Court guidance. Morse v. Frederick, however, was not the stu-
dent speech test case that all of them were hoping for. In particular,
although the National School Boards Association filed an amicus brief
in support of the school district urging the Supreme Court to grant cer-
tiorari on Morse, advocates for religious students were dismayed by that
outcome, with several of them even urging the Court to dismiss the writ
as improvidently granted. In this Article's next section, I turn to the way
in which the amici on both sides approached Morse, the Supreme
Court's ultimate decision in the case (consisting of no less than five sep-
arate opinions), and how that decision shakes out for the still-open ques-
tion of students' potentially hurtful religious speech.
II. MORSE V. FREDERICK'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
ISSUE
Morse v. Frederick certainly comes from a different mold than the
religious speech cases described above. The dispute in Morse arose on
January 24, 2002, when the Olympic Torch Relay passed through
93. See, e.g., L.W. v. Toms River Reg'l. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381,405-07 (N.J. 2007)
(holding that a school district will be liable under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
for "student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile educational environment when the
school district knew or should have known of the harassment, but failed to take action reason-
ably calculated to end the harassment," and rejecting the federal "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard as being too burdensome).
94. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1172 n.6.
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Juneau, Alaska en route to the Olympic Winter Games in Salt Lake City,
Utah.95 Along their route, the torchbearers were to proceed right past
Juneau-Douglas High School.96 The school's principal, Deborah Morse,
decided to allow students and staff to temporarily leave school to watch
the relay from the street.97
Knowing that television cameras would be on the scene to film the
torch parade, high school senior Joseph Frederick brought to the rally a
14-foot banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."9 Just as the torchbear-
ers and camera crews passed by, Frederick and his friends, who were
standing across the street from the school, unfurled the banner.9
Principal Morse immediately crossed the street and ordered the students
to take down the banner, later explaining that she did so because she
considered the banner a violation of a school policy that "prohibit[ed]
any ... public expression that ... advocates the use of substances that
are illegal to minors."'" Frederick's friends complied, but Frederick did
not.'0 ' Morse proceeded to confiscate the banner and suspend Frederick
for 10 days.'02 Frederick then sued, alleging that the punishment had vio-
lated his First Amendment rights.0 3
Throughout the legal proceedings, Frederick denied that the speech
advocated drug use - or, for that matter, anything at all. Instead, he stat-
ed that he chose his slogan to be "meaningless and funny" and to get on
television.' (He also claimed that he had gotten the idea for the slogan
from a snowboard sticker.)' °5 His argument was simply that neither
Tinker, Fraser, nor Hazelwood justified the restriction of his nonsensi-
cal banner: the banner had not caused a material disruption nor invaded
other students' rights; was not offensively lewd; and was not school-
sponsored. Although Frederick lost at the district court level (because
the district court found the banner offensive and deemed Fraser appli-
95. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2622, 2625.
99. Id. at 2622.
100. Id. at 2622-23.
101. Morse, 127 S. Ct at 2622.
102. Id.; see also Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that
according to Frederick, Principal Morse originally suspended him for five days, but when he
quoted Thomas Jefferson to her, she doubled it).
103. Id. at 2623.
104. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1116.
105. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justices to Hear Landmark Free-Speech Case, Washington
Post, Mar. 13, 2007, at A03.
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cable),'" he won a resounding victory at the Ninth Circuit, which con-
cluded that it was so clearly established that Principal Morse's actions
were unjustified under the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood framework that she
was not even entitled to qualified immunity.°"
Principal Morse and the Juneau School Board filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari, arguing that there were two reasons for granting the
writ: (1) addressing whether school districts were entitled to restrict stu-
dent speech "advocating or making light of illegal drug use;" and (2)
evaluating the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Principal Morse was not enti-
tled to qualified immunity, which had set a precedent "deeply alarming
to school administrators throughout the country." ' 8 Meanwhile, the
National School Boards Association (NSBA) and the American
Association of School Administrators (AASA), which together filed an
amicus brief in support of the certiorari petition, took a broader view of
the case.'" Not only did they think Frederick provided the opportunity
to resolve whether schools could restrict pro-drug student speech, but
they also viewed the case as a potential vehicle for clarifying the entire
framework for student speech restrictions - and, in so doing, resolving
some of the thorny issues surrounding students' potentially hurtful reli-
gious speech."' Indeed, their brief explicitly cited Harper and Nixon in
discussing, respectively, the need for clarity as to Tinker's "invasion of
rights" prong and Fraser's "plainly offensive" standard."1
Once the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the NSBA/AASA's subse-
quent amicus brief strongly encouraged the Court to decide the case on
broad grounds that would strengthen the schools' ability to restrict stu-
dent speech. They urged the Court to hold that Fraser permitted schools
to restrict "messages inimical to a school's core educational mission and
ability to instill fundamental civic values and appropriate behavior," and
that Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong allowed schools to censor student
speech that was "threatening or hurtful to [other students] or otherwise at
106. Frederick v. Morse, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27270 (D. Alaska May 27, 2003).
107. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1114.
108. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Juneau Sch. Bd. v. Frederick, 2006 WL 2506659 (2006)
(No. 06-278), at * 12.
109. Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Amicus Curiae National School Boards
Association and American Association of School Administrators in Support of Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Juneau Sch. Bd., 2006 WL 2805329 (2006) (No. 06-278).
110. Id. at * 2.
111. Id. at * 12- * 15.
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odds with the academic and citizenship-building work of the schools."1"2
Making specific reference to Harper, the brief argued that "hurtful mes-
sages by students feeling their free speech oats at the expense of others,
even if the others suffer those messages in silence, can be toxic to a
school's learning environment."'13 The petitioners' own brief, while not
specifically referring to speech that was "hurtful" to other students, also
argued along broad lines, asserting that the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood
trilogy stood "for the proposition that students have limited free speech
rights balanced against the School District's right to carry out its educa-
tional mission and to maintain discipline.""' 4
These proposed rationales alarmed advocates for religious students."5
If, in the course of resolving Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court
interpreted Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong as allowing schools to
restrict student speech that was hurtful to others, where would that leave
students like David Saxe and Tyler Harper, who felt compelled to
express their religiously-motivated opposition to homosexuality? By the
same token, if the Supreme Court upheld Principal Morse's actions on
grounds that schools could restrict student speech that was contrary to
their educational mission, wouldn't that implicitly allow school districts
who taught tolerance of different sexual orientations to limit anti-gay
student speech?
As such, six separate conservatively-oriented religious advocacy
groups - despite the incongruity of their supporting a student who had
waved a 14-foot "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner to get on television -
submitted amicus briefs in favor of Joseph Frederick." 6 Their briefs
112. Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association, American Association of
School Administrators, and National Association of Secondary School Principals In Support of
Petitioners, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 3.
113. Id. at * 21. (The brief linked this argument to Frederick by suggesting that the school
district might have been entitled to restrict the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner on grounds that it
could be "interpreted as mocking Christianity's central religious figure and trivializing faith tra-
ditions." Id.)
114. Brief for Petitioner, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 25 - * 26.
115. For a firsthand account of this reaction and subsequent mobilization, see Douglas
Laycock, Paper Symposium: Speech and the Public Schools After Morse v. Frederick: High
Value Speech and the Basic Educational Mission of a Public School: Some Preliminary
Thoughts, 12 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 111 (2008). Laycock, who co-authored Liberty Legal
Institute's amicus brief, writes that the briefs in the school district's support "spread great alarm
among all free speech advocates who read it, including six conservative Christian groups who
found themselves forced to file briefs in support of a student proclaiming 'BONG HiTS 4
JESUS."' Id. at 114.
116. See supra notes 5-10.
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largely argued along similar lines, urging the Court not to decide the
case on a rationale that would limit students' rights to engage in religious
speech at school. As the Liberty Legal Institute put it:
What amicus fears most is that a loosely worded opinion, holding
that students have no First Amendment right to promote drug use,
will fatally undermine protection for core religious and political
speech in public schools. The vague and deferential standard pro-
posed by Petitioner and her amici invites this consequence. Any
holding that Respondent's sign is unprotected must be very careful-
ly stated to avoid sending an unintended signal that would do seri-
ous damage to the free speech rights of all students, including reli-
gious students." 7
Taken together, these amici made four basic points. First, they argued
that the school district had engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrim-
ination, noting that had Frederick's banner communicated an anti-drug
message, it likely would have been allowed."8 Second, they vehemently
opposed any notion that viewpoint-based restrictions were permissible
whenever the student speech in question ran counter to the school's edu-
cational mission, arguing that this would open the door to widespread
suppression of student views that were not "politically correct.""' 9 Third,
they asked the Court to reject (or not reach) the argument that Tinker's
"invasion of rights" prong justified school restrictions on hurtful
speech. 2° Finally, they urged the Court to either (a) dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted (with the American Center for Law and Justice
suggesting Harper as a better vehicle for revisiting student speech
issues), (b) affirm the Ninth Circuit's judgment in favor of Frederick, or
(c) reverse on the narrowest possible grounds.' Indeed, the Liberty
Legal Institute proposed the following rationale for reversal:
117. Liberty Legal Institute Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 5.
118. See, e.g., ACI Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 6 - * 8; Alliance
Defense Fund Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 6 - *8.
119. See, e.g., Liberty Counsel Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 20 - * 2.
ACL Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 8 - * 9.
120. See, e.g., Christian Legal Society Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 4 -
* 14; Alliance Defense Fund Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 14 - * 18.
121. See, e.g., ACL Brief Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 3 - * 5; Liberty Legal
Institute Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at *2, * 14 - * 15.
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If the Court wishes to reverse in this case, it could carve out an
explicit exception for advocacy of the use of illegal drugs and add
that explicit exception to the sexually explicit speech identified in
[Fraser]. But it must be very clear about the basis for that exception
• . . If a school can prohibit the speech at issue in this case, it is
because the school has a valid rule prohibiting students from using
drugs, and because Respondent's sign might be interpreted as
encouraging student violations of the valid rule of conduct . . .
Nothing in these reasons for restricting advocacy of student mis-
conduct justifies restrictions on advocacy of controversial political
or religious views. 22
That suggested rationale ended up being precisely the hook on which
the Supreme Court majority decided Morse in the school district's favor.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts announced a new standard
for student speech restrictions: "schools may take steps to safeguard
those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regard-
ed as encouraging illegal drug use."'23 In explaining that conclusion, the
majority opinion began by noting that both Fraser and Hazelwood
demonstrated that Tinker's mode of analysis - in particular, its focus on
"substantial disruption" - was "not absolute."'24 These cases also con-
firmed that schools had broader power to restrict student speech than did
the government with respect to adult speech.'25 Having laid that back-
ground, the majority went on to discuss the importance of deterring drug
use, the role of peer pressure in deciding whether to take drugs, and the
"particular challenge" posed by "student speech celebrating illegal drug
use at a school event."'26 The majority specifically rejected the school
district's argument that Frederick's banner could be considered offensive
under Fraser, noting - in a comment that must have pleased the religious
advocacy groups-that this would "stretch[] Fraser too far . . . . After
all, much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive
to some."'27 However, the majority implicitly rejected the notion that
viewpoint-based speech restrictions were inherently impermissible,
122. Liberty Legal Institute Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at *2.
123. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
124. Id. at 2626-27.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2628.
127. Id. at 2629.
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expressing skepticism that "schools are required to tolerate student
advocacy of illegal drug use at school events.' 21
Justice Alito joined the opinion - providing the crucial fifth vote for
the disposition of the case - but wrote separately to make clear his nar-
row grounds for doing so.'29 Thus, as the Fifth Circuit recently noted,
Justice Alito's concurrence is arguably the controlling precedent in the
case.'3 The first sentence of Justice Alito's opinion made clear exactly
where he stood:
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it goes
no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that
a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use
and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social
issue, including speech on issues such as "the wisdom of the war on
drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use."'
Justice Alito strongly disagreed with the school district's argument
that schools could censor any student speech that interfered with their
educational mission, noting that "some public schools have defined their
educational missions as including the inculcation of whatever political
and social views are held" by the school administrators and faculty.32 He
believed, however, that there was a "special characteristic" implicated
by Morse: "the threat to the physical safety of students." '33 While at
school, he observed, "students may be compelled on a daily basis to
spend time at close quarters with other students who may do them
128. Id.
129. Morse, 127 S. Ct at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy joined the concur-
rence.
130. See Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing
Justice Alito's concurrence as the "controlling" opinion in Morse). See also Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single ration-
ale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrow-
est grounds") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
To be sure, as the Seventh Circuit recently pointed out, see Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch.
Dist., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8737, at * 12 - * 13, Justices Alito and Kennedy joined the major-
ity opinion as well, and thus it is indeed a majority opinion rather than a mere plurality.
Nonetheless, Justice Alito's explicit description of the narrow grounds upon which he was join-
ing the Morse majority should be taken into account when applying Morse to future cases.
131. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636.
132. Id. at 2637.
133. Id. at 2638.
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harm."'34 Analogizing to the way that Tinker's "substantial disruption"
prong allows school officials to "intervene before speech leads to vio-
lence," Justice Alito reasoned that "[s]peech advocating illegal drug use
poses a threat to student safety that is just as serious, if not always as
immediately obvious ... illegal drug use presents a grave and in many
ways unique threat to the physical safety of students."'35 Justice Alito
therefore joined the Court's opinion, but concluded by reiterating that he
viewed the opinion as "standing at the far reaches of what the First
Amendment permits," and that he did not view it as "endors[ing] any
further extension. '"136
Clearly, there was much in the majority opinion and Justice Alito's con-
currence to please religious advocacy groups. The two proposed rationales
that had most alarmed these groups - first, the broadening of Fraser's
"offensive" standard to encompass student speech that was contrary to a
school's educational mission; and second, the broadening of Tinker's "inva-
sion of rights" prong to encompass student speech that was potentially hurt-
ful to other students or otherwise contrary to the "citizenship-building work
of the schools" - curried little favor with either the majority opinion or the
Alito concurrence. Both of those opinions rejected the first proposed
rationale (with Alito doing so explicitly, and the majority doing so implic-
itly). And they did not reach - or even mention - the second.
Instead, the Court ended up reversing on precisely the narrow drug-
focused rationale proposed by the Liberty Legal Institute, which prompt-
ly issued a press release calling attention to that fact. 37 Moreover, the
majority opinion and the Alito concurrence included language that
seemed sympathetic to the free speech claims of religious students: the
majority opinion explicitly mentioned religious speech when stating that
Fraser should not be read to "encompass any speech that could fit under
some definition of 'offensive,"" 38 and Justice Alito characterized Morse
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Sam Hodges, Supreme Court Rules Against "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" Student, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 25, 2007. Laycock subsequently reflected: "In an amicus brief for
the Liberty Legal Institute, my co-counsel and I said that if the Court decided to reverse, it need
say no more than that the school could punish advocacy of illegal drug use. It was a rather obvi-
ous solution, and the Court could easily have thought of it without a suggestion from us. I feared
that if the Court tried to state a general principle for when student speech could be suppressed, it
might adopt the principle proffered in the school's brief or some other equally censorious princi-
ple. Laycock, supra note 115, at 112-13.
138. Morse, 127 S. CL at 2629.
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as providing "no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly
be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue."'139
That said, there are four aspects of the Morse majority opinion and the
Alito concurrence that potentially open the door for certain narrowly-
drawn restrictions on students' potentially hurtful speech (religious and
otherwise). First, the very fact that the Supreme Court created a new
basis for restriction of student speech - rather than trying to shoehorn the
case into Tinker, Fraser, or Hazelwood, as the Ninth Circuit had under-
standably done - suggests that other such bases may subsequently be
recognized as well. Indeed, as the majority opinion pointed out, both
Fraser and Hazelwood illustrated that "Tinker is not the only basis for
restricting student speech."'" Morse, in turn, further confirms this prin-
ciple. Of course, Morse itself did not "endorse any further extension," as
Justice Alito emphasized. 4 But a future case may nonetheless persuade
at least five justices to recognize another narrow basis for restricting stu-
dent speech. 42
Second, both the majority and the Alito concurrence emphasized the
protection of student safety as a persuasive reason for upholding restric-
tions on speech advocating illegal drug use.'43 But the speech at issue
certainly did not compel students to take drugs and thus risk their health
(e.g., "Smoke pot or I'll beat you up."). Rather, the majority opinion
identified two plausible pro-drug interpretations of Frederick's banner:
(1) an imperative statement: "[t]ake bong hits;" or (2) a declarative
observation: "[b]ong hits are a good thing."'" Thus, to the extent that the
banner urged illegal drug use, it did so through the imprecise workings
of peer pressure - by suggesting to students that, as the majority opinion
put it, "the norms in school ... tolerate[d]" drug use. 145 As John Taylor
has noted, neither the majority opinion nor the Alito concurrence cited
any evidence that this sort of banner actually would increase student
drug use. 46 Justice Stevens' dissent specifically stated that "[t]he notion
139. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2627.
141. Id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
142. For instance, Justice Breyer took no position at all on the underlying First Amendment
issue in Morse, instead arguing that the Court should simply have resolved the case on grounds
that Principal Morse was entitled to qualified immunity, because the law did not clearly prohibit
her actions. Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
143. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628, 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 2625.
145. Id. at 2628.
146. See Taylor, supra note 4, at 230.
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that the message on this banner would actually persuade either the aver-
age student or even the dumbest one to change his or her behavior is
most implausible.' 47 Nonetheless, the banner's message, in the view of
the majority opinion and the Alito concurrence, sufficiently endangered
students' physical safety to warrant restriction of the banner. 141
Similarly, as I discuss further in this Article's next section, other stu-
dent speech (again, religiously-motivated or not) may be so hurtful to
other students that it poses a threat to their safety analogous to - if not
greater than - that posed by Frederick's banner. Such speech may cause
targeted students to experience distress that manifests itself in psycho-
logical and physical symptoms, encourage other students to physically
harm the targeted students, or prompt the targeted students to physical-
ly strike back in ways that endanger themselves, the original aggressor,
and/or other student bystanders. Indeed, as Justice Alito interestingly
stated, "[e]xperience shows that schools can be places of special danger"
because students have little opportunity to avoid fellow students who
"may do them harm."'' 49
Third, the Morse majority and the Alito concurrence honed in on the
importance of whether the student speech at issue has some political
content to it - a point previously alluded to in Fraser. The majority
specifically quoted Frederick's claim that "the words were just nonsense
meant to attract television cameras,""'5 and later returned to this issue,
reiterating-in response to the dissent's concern that the majority hold-
ing would squelch student debate over drug policy issues-that "not
even Frederick argues that the banner conveys any sort of political or
religious message,""'' and that "this is plainly not a case about political
debate over the criminalization of drug use or possession." '52 This lan-
guage suggests that the result might have been different had Frederick's
banner stated "Legalize marijuana," or, at the very least, that this would
have been a tougher case. Justice Alito went even further, stating that he
was joining the opinion on the understanding that it would not permit
147. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. See Nuxoll, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8737, at * 14 - * 15 ("we know from Morse that
the Supreme Court will let a school ban speech - even speech outside the school premises - that
encourages the use of illegal drugs, without the school's having to prove a causal relation
between the speech and drug use.").
149. Morse, 127 S. CL at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 2624.
151. Id. at 2625.
152. Id.
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restrictions on speech regarding political issues such as the legalization
of marijuana.53 This focus, as I discuss more fully in the Article's next
section, suggests that the degree of real political content (as opposed to
ad hominem personal attacks) in a student's potentially hurtful speech
should be central to the analysis of whether a school can restrict it.
Finally, although the American Center for Law and Justice's amicus
brief had urged the Court to rule in Frederick's favor on grounds that the
school had committed viewpoint-discrimination' 4 - an argument having
yielded the ACLJ great success in other religious speech cases, such as
Lamb's Chapel - that argument held little sway with the majority or the
Alito concurrence. Indeed, in holding that schools could censor student
speech that advocated illegal drug use (while, presumably, allowing stu-
dent speech that opposed illegal drug use), the Morse Court endorsed an
explicitly viewpoint-based rationale. Moreover, even the Morse dissent
stated that "it might well be appropriate to tolerate some targeted view-
point discrimination in this unique setting."'55 Kristi Bowman similarly
reads Morse as implying that, in certain circumstances, school districts
can engage in limited viewpoint discrimination.156
These threads from Morse - the emphasis on the way student speech
can endanger other students' safety; the focus on whether the student
speech at issue has real political content; and the recognition that view-
point-discrimination is not necessarily unconstitutional in the school set-
ting - have important implications for the question of how courts should
deal with students' potentially hurtful speech (religious and otherwise).
Thus, in this Article's final section, I focus on weaving them together
with key strands of Tinker and Fraser in order to propose a new standard
for analyzing such clashes. I also discuss how the Seventh Circuit's
recent Nuxoll decision - the first post-Morse circuit decision on this
issue - largely accords with my proposed approach.
153. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
154. ACLJ Brief, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278), at * 6 - * 8.
155. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and Souter joined
the dissent.
156. See Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students' Religious Speech and Viewpoint
Discrimination, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 187, 192, 219 (2007). Bowman adds, however, that
"[b]ecause Morse is so self-limiting, it does not clarify much in the maze of student speech law."
Id. at 192.
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III. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING
STUDENTS' POTENTIALLY HURTFUL SPEECH
(RELIGIOUS AND OTHERWISE)
While Morse did not reach the issue of whether schools can restrict
students' potentially hurtful speech, the aspects identified above, partic-
ularly when combined with Tinker and Fraser, shed light on how to
approach the issue. In particular, Morse's emphasis on the way some stu-
dent speech can endanger other students' safety connects up interesting-
ly with Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong, and Morse's emphasis on the
degree of political content in the speech in question resonates with
Fraser's focus on that point.
Pulling these considerations together suggests that it is first crucial to
distinguish between two types of potentially hurtful student speech,
whether religiously-motivated or not: (1) speech that identifies particu-
lar students for attack; and (2) speech (such as Harper's T-shirt) that
expresses a general political, social, or religious viewpoint without
directly naming or speaking to particular students. Morse, Tinker, and
Fraser all suggest that schools should receive much greater latitude to
restrict the first category of potentially hurtful speech. Indeed, this dis-
tinction mirrors Justice Alito's distinction in Morse between student
speech that advocates illegal drug use (like Frederick's banner) and stu-
dent speech "that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issue."'57 This distinction also echoes the dividing-line
proposed by Eugene Volokh in the context of Title VII workplace harass-
ment."58
A. Student Speech That Identifies Particular Students For Attack
Student speech that personally attacks other students is analogous to
Frederick's banner in two key ways. First, when a student makes hurtful
remarks to or about a fellow student, that speech - particularly if it
occurs repeatedly-has the same sort of potential (if not more) to endan-
157. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
158. See Volokh, supra note 32, at 1798 (arguing that the "directed speech/undirected
speech distinction" provides "the most practical place to draw the line between harassing work-
place speech that must be protected and harassing workplace speech that may be restricted"). In
a draft of a new article, John Taylor has also endorsed using this dividing-line in the student
speech context. See John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, available at SSRN:
http://ssm.com/abstract=l 137909 (hereinafter Taylor, Viewpoint Discrimination), at 52.
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ger student safety as does a "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner. To be sure, drug
use poses a severe threat to student safety. But as discussed above, the
link between Frederick's banner and other students' subsequent drug use
was attenuated at best. By contrast, there is a clear and direct causal link
between verbal bullying and subsequent student harm. One recent study
unsurprisingly indicates that students subjected to name-calling or other
forms of verbal victimization "feel more depressed, anxious, and lonely
than students who do not view themselves as frequent targets." '159 This
psychological distress, in turn, can lead to physical illnesses, such as
colds, headaches, and stomach aches.'" So too can it lead to self-destruc-
tive behaviors, such as suicidal ideation.' Also noteworthy is the link
theorized by some experts between verbal harassment and subsequent
violent behavior by the victimized students.'62
Students' ad hominem verbal attacks on other students therefore
implicate Morse's emphasis on permitting schools to restrict student
159. See Adrienne Nishina, Jaana Juvonen, and Melissa R. Witkow, Sticks and Stones May
Break My Bones, but Names Will Make Me Feel Sick: The Psychosocial, Somatic, and Scholastic
Consequences of Peer Harassment, 34 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL CHILD AND ADOLESCENT
PSYCHOLOGY 37, 45 (Mar. 2005). See also Becky Kochenderfer Ladd & Gary W. Ladd, Variations
in Peer Victimization: Relations to Children's Maladjustment, in PEER HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL:
THE PLIGHT OF THE VULNERABLE AND THE VICTIMIZED 25, 27 (Jaana Juvonen & Sandra Graham
eds., 2001). ("Investigators have linked peer victimization to loneliness, depression, anxiety, low
self-esteem, social problems (e.g., peer rejection, friendlessness), and school maladjustment.").
160. See Nishina et. al., supra note 159, at 46 (describing studies indicating that peer harass-
ment increases the risk of physical illness by increasing stress hormones that suppress immune
system functioning, and by activating the areas of the brain that register physical pain). The
authors conclude that "students who are targets of peer harassment may be more likely to get
colds or other illnesses that prevent them from going to school." See also Ken Rigby, Health
Consequences of Bullying and Its Prevention in Schools, in PEER HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL: THE
PLIGHT OF THE VULNERABLE AND THE VICTIMIZED 310, 316 (Jaana Juvonen & Sandra Graham eds.,
2001). Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties, 77 TEMP L. REv. 641, 646-49 (2004).
161. See Rigby, supra note 160, at 311 (stating that there is "some evidence that peer vic-
timization is related to suicidal ideation, that is, the tendency to think about killing oneself. Such
thinking is commonly a precursor to committing suicide"). Rigby adds that several cases of sui-
cide have indeed been "attributed to the experience of repeated victimization," but that "it is dif-
ficult to validate such claims, despite the fact that suicide notes sometimes point to peer victim-
ization as the cause"). Id.
162. After the 1999 Columbine massacre by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, for instance,
many members of the Columbine High School spoke out about a climate of bullying in the
school, and some suggested that this had influenced the behavior of Harris and Klebold. See, e.g.,
Howard Pankratz, Columbine Bulling No Myth, Panel Told, DENVER POST, Oct. 3, 2000. In the
massacre's aftermath, Colorado Governor Bill Owens signed an executive order creating the
Columbine Review Commission to conduct an independent investigation of what had occurred.
See The Report of Governor Bill Owens' Columbine Review Commission, available at
http://www.state.co.us/columbine/Columbine_20ReportWEB.pdf (last visited July 01, 2008).
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speech in order to protect other students' safety, and, arguably, Tinker's
"invasion of rights" prong as well. Indeed, just as Justice Alito's con-
currence described Tinker's "'substantial disruption' standard [as] per-
mit[ting] school officials to step in before actual violence erupts,"' 6 3
Morse's emphasis on student safety can be used as a sort of gloss on
Tinker's "invasion of rights" standard, allowing school officials to take
action before a student suffers physical harm due to another student's
verbal bullying.
Second, often such ad hominem speech - for example, derogatory
remarks about another student's appearance, clothing, or personality -
will lack any political content at all, just like Frederick's banner.161 And
even when such speech does possess some degree of political content -
such as disparagement of a student for his sexual orientation or religion
- the political aspect of the speech and the ad hominem aspect can large-
ly be decoupled. To put it bluntly, a student can express his belief that
Jesus Christ is the only path to salvation, or that homosexuality is sinful,
without singling out non-Christian or gay students and telling them that
The Commission's subsequent report noted that it heard conflicting testimony about the sig-
nificance and extent of bullying at Columbine High School, with parents, students, and a
teacher's aide describing significant bullying, in contrast to the testimony of the school principal
and many staff members that bullying was not a problem at the school. Id. at 98 & n.2 11. The
Commission concluded that while it could not "assert that bullying at Columbine High School
caused the homicidal attack on April 20, 1999," it had received testimony that "the perpetrators
had been victims of bullying at the school and had been taunted and rejected by fellow students."
Id. at 99 & n.212. The report added:
[M]ost students seem able to tolerate a moderate amount of bullying and taunting. But
experts on school violence believe that a significant number of students are less able to
tolerate bullying and peer rejection than their fellow students, particularly when that
bullying becomes intimidation. These students can become seriously depressed as a
consequence of harassing treatment by fellow students, which in turn can lead to an
internal building-up of smoldering anger and resentment. Lethal results can ensue
when that anger and resentment are set within the matrix of societal factors, for exam-
ple, an entertainment industry that glorifies violence, news coverage that concentrates
on sensational violence, the ready availability of weapons, and even the dissemination
of Internet diagrams for the construction of explosive and incendiary devices.
Id. at 99.
163. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
164. In other words, such speech will be "low value" in nature, a classification that several
commentators interpret the Morse court as having implicitly applied to Frederick's banner. See
Taylor, supra note 4, at 228 & nn. 18, 27 ("Morse creates a narrow category of low-value speech
that encompasses only student advocacy of illegal drugs.... Though the Court does not use the ter-
minology of low-value speech, this is the reading on which the case makes the most sense.");
Andrew Canter & Gabriel Pardo, Notes & Comments: The Court's Missed Opportunity in Harper
v. Poway, 2008 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 125, 126 (2008) (describing Morse v. Frederick as presenting
a "simplistic question pitting low-value speech against a high government interest"). See also,
e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 297 (1995).
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they are going to Hell or calling them derogatory names. (Indeed, the
religious speech cases described in this Article's first section, such as
Harper, falls into the second category of expressing a viewpoint without
targeting particular students by name for attack.) If anything, the politi-
cal impact of the speech is likely to be stronger if its ad hominem aspect
is removed. As Eugene Volokh has argued in the context of workplace
harassment, "targeted offensive speech is quite unlikely to convince or
edify the listener; in most cases, it is likely only to offend."1 65
Given the Supreme Court's emphasis in both Morse and Fraser on the
lack of any real political content in the student speech in question, the
absence (or near-absence) of such content here should likewise be sig-
nificant. Also relevant is the Fraser Court's statement that "schools must
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order."'
6
Prohibiting students from mocking and attacking each other personally,
while leaving space for them to express their general political view-
points, is consistent with that sentiment. Indeed, depending on the extent
and viciousness of the personal attacks, such speech might even be con-
sidered "fighting words" that are entirely unprotected by the First
Amendment. 167
Thus, while the scope of schools' federal liability for failing to prevent
peer harassment is limited to relatively egregious circumstances, schools
165. Volokh, supra note 32, at 1871-72. Volokh argues that as a result, "[d]irected speech
can be suppressed with minimum impact on First Amendment interests," while the suppression
of "undirected speech" in which employees "spread[] their political and social opinions to other,
willing, listeners" raises grave First Amendment concerns. Id.
166. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
167. See, e.g., Nuxoll, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8737, at * 5 - * 6 (stating that the plaintiff
"concede[d] that he could not inscribe 'homosexuals go to Hell' on his T-shirt because those are
fighting words and so can be prohibited despite their expressive content and arguable theologi-
cal support."). In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court defined "fighting words"
as "those words which by their very utterance.. tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Of course, the precise boundaries of that category are blurry. See, e.g., Linda Friedlieb,
Comment, The Epitome of an Insult: A Constitutional Approach to Designated Fighting Words, 72
U. CI. L. REv. 385, 385-386 (2005) ("Ordinary fighting words are personalized insults that by
definition make the listener to whom the speech is directed fight back almost instinctively...
While the Supreme Court declared that fighting words is a 'well-defined' class of speech, whether
any individual's speech constitutes unprotected fighting words rather than expression protected by
the First Amendment is anything but clear. In most cases, state and local judges and law enforce-
ment decide whether a particular expression of speech directed to a particular listener in a partic-
ular situation is sufficiently likely to provoke a breach of the peace by an ordinary listener in that
situation.") In addition, even prohibitions of fighting words can sometimes raise viewpoint-dis-
crimination concerns. See R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-396 (1992); Saxe, 240 F.
3d at 207-209.
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should generally be free to take action against verbal bullying and to
encourage students to treat each other with personal respect. As the
Third Circuit wrote in Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of
Education'68 (which postdated Saxe):
Intimidation of one student by another, including intimidation by
name calling, is the kind of behavior school authorities are expect-
ed to prevent. There is no constitutional right to be a bully...
Schools are generally permitted to step in and protect students from
abuse.169
Indeed, just as Morse recognized the schools' authority to restrict stu-
dent speech advocating illegal drug use, so too should future courts rec-
ognize - as an independent basis for speech restrictions - the schools'
authority to restrict student speech that singles out other students for
name-calling or other verbal abuse. In other words, schools should be
able to proactively limit such personally-directed speech without fitting
it into the boxes of Tinker's two prongs. 70 When the personally-directed
speech is entirely lacking in political content (for example, mocking a
student's weight), it should be automatically proscribable. And even
when the personally-directed speech arguably has some degree of polit-
ical content (for example, attacking a student for his religion or sexual
orientation), its restriction should be presumptively constitutional,
absent a factual showing that the school's primary motivation was not
concern for the feelings of the targeted student. The student speaker can
then obtain greater protection by recasting his message in general terms,
thus shifting his speech into the second category - to which I now turn.
168. 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
169. Id. at 264.
170. Taylor alternatively suggests that such personally-directed speech can be restricted
under Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong, as an infringement of the "right to be left alone." See
Taylor, supra note 4, at 51 n.196 and 52. Although I agree that linker's "invasion of rights"
prong provides an important conceptual hook for the notion that such speech is unprotected, I am
reluctant to state that all name-calling and other personally-directed speech necessarily rises to
the level of invading the other student's rights. I am unpersuaded that in all such cases, an actu-
al right is being violated. In my view, a more convincing way to think about it is to view such
speech, like the advocacy of illegal drug use in Morse, as a carve-out from the linker standard,
given its lack of political content and threat to student safety.
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B. Student Speech That Expresses a General Political, Social, or
Religious Viewpoint Without Singling Out a Particular Student
The harder question is presented by the second category: student
speech, like Harper's "Homosexuality is shameful" T-shirt, which
expresses a general political, social, or religious viewpoint that other stu-
dents may find hurtful, even though the speech does not single them out
by name. 7' The link between such speech and other students' physical
safety is certainly still plausible here, depending on the circumstances,
but it is less direct. Moreover, this type of speech generally possesses real
political content to it, as in Harper and the various other anti-gay and pro-
life speech cases described above. Morse's emphasis on this factor - and,
in particular, Justice Alito's suggestion that he would not support "any
restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on
any political or social issue"'72 - points toward the presumptive unconsti-
tutionality of restricting such speech. Thus, although Morse did not reach
the issue, it does implicitly call into question the Harper majority's
approach of using Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong to justify restrict-
ing all student speech "that strikes at a core identifying characteristic of
students on the basis of their membership in a minority group" with
respect to race, religion, or sexual orientation.'73
But while restrictions on this type of speech may be presumptively
unconstitutional, that does not mean that the presumption cannot be
rebutted. Here is where Tinker's two alternative justifications for
restricting student speech - preventing either "substantial disruption" or
"invasion of the rights of others" - still have an important role to play.
171. Taylor agrees that "once we move away from speech that is directed at particular stu-
dents, matters become more difficult." Id. at 52.
172. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
173. Had the Harper court limited its holding to "derogatory and injurious remarks" made
directly to or about particular named students, and had it omitted the "minority group" specifi-
cation, that would be fully consistent with the approach that this Article has proposed.
Interestingly, in resolving the motion for subsequent reconsideration filed by Harper's sister
(who became the new plaintiff once Harper had graduated), the district court did not view Morse
as having undercut Harper's reasoning at all. Instead, the court stated that Morse had "affirm[ed]
that school officials have a duty to protect students, as young as fourteen and fifteen years of age,
from degrading acts or expressions that promote injury to the student's physical, emotional or
psychological well-being and development which, in turn, adversely impacts the school's mis-
sion to educate them." Harper, Civ. No. 04-CV-1103, JAR (POR), slip op. at 9 (S.D. Ca. Feb.
11, 2008). As discussed throughout this article, although I agree that this is an important theme
within Morse, Morse also implied that courts must balance this consideration with the need to
protect other students' expression of their political views. Here, the Harper district court failed
to give adequate attention to the latter half of the equation before reaching its conclusion.
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The lingering issue, which Morse did not address, is where the threshold
lies for satisfaction of these prongs. As described above, courts are
unsettled as to whether (1) the "substantial disruption" prong can be sat-
isfied by substantial disruption of a single student's educational experi-
ence, as opposed to a more widespread disruption; and (2) the "invasion
of rights" prong can be satisfied in cases where the student speech does
not fall into a traditional tort category like defamation.
Given Justice Alito's role as the deciding Morse vote, it is helpful to
look back at his Third Circuit Saxe opinion for clues as to how he might
answer these questions. And, indeed, Saxe provides some useful
insights, although it leaves room for interpretation. As noted above, the
Saxe Court essentially answered the first question in the affirmative, by
stating that restrictions on speech "that would 'substantially interfere
with a student's educational performance"' could satisfy Tinker's "sub-
stantial disruption" standard. 74
What Saxe left ambiguous, however, was its construction of the "inva-
sion of rights" prong. It stated that this prong did not authorize restrict-
ing speech that was "merely offensive to some listener." '75 It then criti-
cized the school district's anti-harassment policy for prohibiting speech
that created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment but fail-
ing to "require any threshold showing of severity or pervasiveness." '76
This observation, however, yields several questions. First, if the relevant
provision had required a threshold showing of severity or pervasiveness,
would that have rendered it constitutional? If so, what does such a
"threshold showing" entail? Must the harassment be so severe and per-
vasive as to effectively deprive the victim of equal access to the school's
resources and opportunities - the federal standard for holding schools
liable for their failure to stop peer harassment - or can the threshold for
permitting school intervention be set somewhat lower?' 77 Finally, does
the necessary threshold for harassment to satisfy the "invasion of rights"
prong, wherever that threshold is set, also carry over to the "substantial
174. Saxe, 240 .3d at 217 (emphasis added).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. On the one hand, Saxe clearly borrowed from Davis in employing the "severity and
pervasiveness" language, suggesting that perhaps it envisioned the standards as being identical.
On the other hand, Saxe's focus on whether the policy included "any threshold showing of sever-
ity or pervasiveness" does not foreclose the possibility that some lower, albeit still substantial,
standard could be used. Indeed, as discussed further below, I support a somewhat less stringent
but still rigorous test.
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disruption" prong, defining what it means for a student's educational
performance to be substantially disrupted? Or can hurtful speech sub-
stantially disrupt a student's educational experience even without rising
to the level of invading his rights? Conversely, can hurtful speech invade
a student's rights without substantially disrupting his educational expe-
rience?
Given the type of speech that we are now considering - student speech
that expresses a general political, social, or religious viewpoint that
other students may find hurtful, but that does not personally attack them
by name - these questions come into sharper focus. The last question is
probably the easiest to answer. If the hurtful but non-personally-direct-
ed speech does not substantially disrupt even one other student's educa-
tional experience, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court - given its
solicitude in Morse for student speech that contains political content -
would interpret Tinker's "invasion of rights" prong as allowing schools
to restrict it.
Indeed, Tinker's "substantial disruption" prong seems to be pulling the
laboring oar here: it is difficult to imagine a situation where the "inva-
sion of rights" prong would be satisfied by non-personally-directed (yet
hurtful) speech without the "substantial disruption" prong being met as
well. The hard questions, therefore, are the ones that probe the meaning
of the "substantial disruption" test. Morse certainly did nothing to under-
mine Justice Alito's contention in Saxe that student speech can be
restricted when it substantially disrupts one other student's educational
performance. At the same time, its solicitude for student expression does
suggest that substantial disruption itself should be defined stringently.
The most stringent definition, of course, would borrow from the fed-
eral threshold for holding schools liable for failing to stop student-on-
student harassment, as developed by the Davis Court in the context of
Title IX. It would state that schools can restrict non-personally-directed
student speech only when that speech is "so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive [other students] of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the
school."'78
This is a tempting solution because the argument that a student's
rights are being violated is strongest here: the source of those rights can
178. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1 (1981)).
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be found in federal legislation. Yet the notion that schools can prohibit
only the speech that they must prohibit, and that there is no room for
educational discretion below that line, is inappropriately cabined. First,
it suggests that if the speech is not in some way gender-based (and is
thus outside of Title IX's ambit), or analogously based on race, color, or
national origin (thus falling within Title VI's ambit'79), schools have no
authority to act - even if the speech is so severely and pervasively offen-
sive that it is depriving other students of equal access to the school's
resources. It is one thing to say that schools cannot be held liable in such
instances for their failures to act; it is quite another to say that they can-
not act even if they want to.
Furthermore, the key interests that prompted the Davis Court to adopt
this particularly stringent standard for school liability under Title IX are
inapplicable here.
The Davis Court's narrow definition of actionable peer harassment,
for purposes of Title IX, was designed to protect school districts from
liability, on both textual and policy grounds. At the textual level, the
Davis Court explained that because Title IX was Spending Clause legis-
lation, the "clear statement" rule applied: private damages could be
available only where school districts "had adequate notice that they
could be liable for the conduct at issue." 180 Thus, for a school district to
be held liable under Title IX for its deliberate indifference to peer harass-
ment, the harassment had to be so egregious that it clearly violated Title
IX's prohibition of denying students access to educational benefits and
opportunities on the basis of their gender, thus providing the requisite
notice to schools of their legal obligation to act.'1 At the policy level, the
Davis Court emphasized that schools should retain substantial discretion
in choosing how to respond to peer harassment and that "courts should
refrain from second guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school
administrators," adding, "we acknowledge that school administrators
shoulder substantial burdens as a result of legal constraints on their dis-
ciplinary authority.""8 2 The Davis Court thus made clear that it was
adopting this narrow standard for liability in order to protect schools'
flexibility and discretion in all but the most extreme cases.
179. See supra note 55.
180. Id. at 640.
181. Id. at 649-50 (concluding that "student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently
severe, can... rise to the level of discrimination actionable under the statute").
182. Id. at 649.
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Such concerns are not present when, as opposed to failing to take
action against peer harassment, a school has voluntarily chosen to act.
Indeed, they are flipped on their head. It would be a perverse distortion
of Davis to import its narrow definition of harassment into the student
speech context and to hold school districts liable for censoring any hurt-
ful student speech that does not reach that high threshold. That approach
would increase school districts' potential liability and lessen their disci-
plinary discretion - the precise opposite of v.'hat the Davis Court intend-
ed.
In my view, therefore, an appropriately robust construction of the
"substantial disruption" prong is to hold that the student speech must
pose a real likelihood of undermining at least one other student's ability
to effectively learn and succeed in school, as measured by school atten-
dance, grades, test scores, or similar indicia. While that approach is less
stringent than the Davis standard - indeed, the Davis Court made clear
that a "mere decline in grades" on the part of the victimized student
would be unlikely to give that student a cognizable Title IX claim
against the district'83 - it still has teeth. Schools should not be able to sat-
isfy it by simply citing general concerns that the speech might adverse-
ly affect students, but should instead have to adduce some specific evi-
dence that at least one particular student's educational performance is
suffering, or likely to suffer, as a result of the speech. When student
speech is indeed genuinely threatening another student's education in
this way, schools should be able to restrict it under Tinker's "substantial
disruption" prong.
In Nuxoll, the first post-Morse circuit case to address the issue of stu-
dent speech that is hurtful but not personally-directed, the Seventh
Circuit did a good job of striking this balance. In evaluating the defen-
dant school district's prohibition - pursuant to a school rule forbidding
"derogatory comments" that "refer to race, ethnicity, religion, gender,
sexual orientation, or disability" - of a T-shirt stating "Be Happy, Not
Gay," the court noted that the school rule itself appeared constitution-
al.'" It read Morse, as I do, as suggesting that "if there is reason to think
that a particular type of student speech that will lead to a decline in stu-
dents' test scores, an upsurge in truancy, or other symptoms of a sick
school - symptoms therefore of substantial disruption - the school can
183. Id. at 652.
184. Nuxoll, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8737, at * 15 - * 18.
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forbid the speech."'85 It concluded that the school rule satisfied this test,
by prohibiting derogatory remarks about "unalterable or otherwise
deeply rooted personal characteristics about which most people, includ-
ing - perhaps especially including - adolescent schoolchildren, are high-
ly sensitive." '86 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the application of
the rule to this particular T-shirt was unconstitutional, because the "Be
Happy, Not Gay" slogan was only "tepidly negative" rather than truly
derogatory, and there was no real showing that the T-shirt would "poi-
son the educational atmosphere."1 87
Here, too, I agree. Although my approach would attack the question
slightly differently - first, by concluding that the T-shirt was not per-
sonally directed (and thus not proscribable on that basis), and then by
analyzing whether it was likely to interfere with at least one other stu-
dent's ability to learn and succeed at school - it would lead to the same
conclusion. By contrast, the stronger language in Harper's T-shirt - the
statements that homosexuality is shameful and that God has condemned
it - would trigger the same two-step inquiry, but might well lead to a dif-
ferent conclusion. Here, too, the T-shirt was not personally directed. But
depending on the facts about particular students in Harper's school, a
court might well foresee a real likelihood that Harper's T-shirt would
sufficiently interfere with another student's educational performance,
thus warranting its prohibition.188
IV. CONCLUSION
Morse does not conclusively tell us how to resolve all clashes over
students' potentially hurtful speech, religious or otherwise. For a case
that ostensibly seemed unrelated to these sorts of issues, however, Morse
does at least offer some useful guidelines.
Perhaps most helpfully, Morse points toward a useful distinction
between student speech that identifies particular students for attack, and
student speech that is primarily commenting on a political, social, or
185. Id. at * 15.
186. Id. at * 6. The court added that "[sluch comments can strike a person at the core of his
being." Id. at * 7.
187. Id. at * 20 - * 21.
188. Indeed, as noted above, the Nuxoll Court suggested that this type of speech might even
be considered unprotected "fighting words," although it did not explicitly rule on that issue. Id.
at * 5 - * 6.
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religious issue. Building on that distinction, I argue that restrictions as to
the first category should generally be constitutional, just as restrictions
on speech advocating illegal drug use now are under Morse. Restrictions
as to the second category, by contrast, should trigger Tinker, and be pre-
sumptively unconstitutional unless there is a real likelihood of substan-
tial disruption to at least one other student's educational performance. In
further explicating and applying this "substantial disruption" standard,
courts should be guided by Morse's recognition that protection of stu-
dents' expression of political, social, and religious opinions and their
psychological well-being are both important interests. This, in turn, sug-
gests that when it comes to speech like Harper's and Nuxoll's T-shirts, a
carefully-drawn factual analysis that balances these considerations is the
best approach.
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